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[L. A. No. 24935.

In Bank. Dec. 19, 1958.]

LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT,
Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Btreets-Franchises.-In the absence of a provision to the contrary, a public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets
subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein
at its own expense when necessary to make way for proper
governmental use of thc streets.
[2] Id.-Fra.nchises.-The laying of sewers is a governmental as
distinct from a proprietary function under the rule that a
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject
to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its
own expense when necessary to make way for proper governmental use; in this respect no distinction is made between
sanitary sewers and storm drains or sewers.
[3] Id.-Franchises.-The obligation of a public utility accepting
franchise rights in public streets to relocate its facilities to

[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Highwuys and Streets, §§ 2M, 205.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5, 7-10] Streets, § 44; [6] Waters,
§ 593(1).
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[4]

[6]

[6]

[?]

[8]

make way for the construction of storm drains by a county
flood control district is not affected by the fact that the principal purpose of the drains may be to drain the entire area
served and not merely the streets thereof, since it would be
impossible to provide drainage for the public streets without
also draining the surrounding land, and the right of abutting
owners to discharge surface waters onto the public streets is
recognized as a customary use of streets.
Id.-Franchises.-The fact that a comprehensive 1100d control
system requires construction of trunk drains that primarily
service areas other than the streets under or across which they
are located does not dect the character of the public use or
limit the public's rights in the public streets, and hence does
not affect a public utility's franchise obligations to relocate its
facilities to make way for the construction of storm drains
by a county flood control district.
IcL-Franchises.-A utility's franchise obligations in public
streets rest on the paramount right of the people as a whole
to use the public streets wherever located, and the fact that a
franchise is granted by one political subdivision as an agent
of the state does not defeat the right of another such agent
acting in its governmental capacity to invoke the public right
for the public benefit.
Wa.ters-Flood Oontrol Districts-Powers.-Under a statute
expressly authorizing a county 1I0od control district to "eonstruct, maintain and operate" storm drains, the district in
doing so is exercising the police power of the state.
8treeta-Franchises.-Wbere a public utility accepted its
franchise rights in public streets subject to implied obligations
to relocate its facilities at its own expense when necessary •
to make way for proper governmental uses of the streets, there
was no need for the .tate expressly to authorize a county
lIood control district to impose such obligations, since the utility had already assumed them.
IcL-Franchises.-A statutory amendment providing that nothing in the statute shan be deemed to authorize a county flood
control district to take, damage or destroy any property or to
require the removal, relocation or alteration of any facility or
structure unless just compensation therefor be first made "in
the manner and to the utent required by the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of California," cannot
reasonably be interpreted to mcan that compensation is to be
made in the manner and to the extent that would be required
if the constitutional provisions required compensation; it
clearly provides for compensation only as "required" by those

•. [6] See Oal.lur., Waters, § 901; Am.lur.,Waters, § 98.

)
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prOVISIOns, and constitutes legh:lutive recognition that the
district is not obligated to pay for utility relocations unless
constitutional provisions so require.
[9] Id.-Franchises.-A franchise exercised by a county flood con·
trol district in the public streets in its governmental capacity
is not subordinate to a prior franchise granted a public utility.
[10] Id.-Franchises.-Though the express terms of a statute define the obligation of a public utility to relocate its facilities
at its own expense, this does not, by application of the maxim
eg;p,.essio u"iu8 exclusio alterius est, exclude other similar
obligations; the rule of strict construction of public grants in
the public interest compels such conclusion where the provisions relied on as excluding any implied obligations may
reasonably be interpreted as no more than partial expressions
of common-law rights and obligations inserted out of an
abundance of caution or by way of example only, and where,
had the statute referred only to removal, it might east doubt on
the right to relocate instead when relocation would be sufficient
to subserve the public interest; the enumeration of what were
considered to be the most important of the utilities' obligations
cannot reasonably be interpreted as an express direction of the
Legislature passing the utilities' other obligations over to the
taxpayers.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for declaratory relief against public utilities maintaining facilities that must be relocated in the public streets
to make way for construction of storm drains by plaintiff
district, in which one defendant utility cross-complained to
recover costs of certain relocations. Judgment for such defendant, after a severance was granted as to it, reversed with
directions.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, for Appellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Norman S. Sterry, Ira C. Powers
and Martin E. Whelan, Jr., for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiif, Los Angeles County Flood Control District, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of
defendant, Southern California Edison Company, in an action
brought for declaratory relief against numerous public utili-
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ties maintaining facilities that mnst be relocated in the public
streets to make way for the construction of storm drains by the
district. Edison cross-complained to recover the costs of certain relocations and for declaratory relief with respect to
others not included in the complaint. A severance was granted
as. to Edison, and the only parties to the trial and this appeal
are Edison and the district.
The relocations involved are all located within various cities
in the county of Los Angeles other than the city of Los
Angeles. No question is presented as to the cost of relocating
facilities in the unincorporated area of the county or within
the city of Los Angeles. In the cities that are involved,
Edison operates under various types of franchises; franchises
granted pursuant to article XI, section 19 of the California
Constitution as it existed before 1911, franchises granted by
charter cities, franchises granted by both charter and noncharter cities pursuant to the Franchise Act of 1937 (now
Pub. Util. Code, §§ 6201-6302), and other franchises not
granted under the 1937 Act but which Edison contends have
the same legal effect for the purposes of this action.
The district is engaged in a comprehensive flood control
program involving among other things the construction of
storm drains throughout its territory. It is conceded that
Edison may properly be required to relocate its facilities in the
public streets to make way for the construction of the drains.
The sole issue is whether Edison or the district must bear
the cost of such relocations.
[1] In Southern Oalif. Gas 00. "Y. Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d
713, 716 [329 P.2d 289], we stated that "In the absence of a
provision to the contrary it has generally been held that a
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject
to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its
own expense when necessary to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets. [Citations.] [2] The laying
of sewers is a governmental as distinct from a proprietary
function under the foregoing rule. [Citations.]" In this
respect no distinction has been made between sanitary sewers
and storm drains or sewers. (New Orleans Gaslight 00. v.
Drainage Oom., 197 U.S. 453, 461-462 [25 8.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed.
831] ; B. d': Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex reI. Gi'imwooc7, 200 U.S.
561,691 [26 S.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596] ; see aho .~fafiel' of L. «;
W. Orphan Home, 92 N.Y. 116, 119; Oity of ChlCirl1lati v.
Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499, 508 [8 Am.Rep. 73] ; Stoudinger v.
Oity of Newark, 28 N.J.Eq. 446, 448; Cummins v. City of

Dec.1958] L.A. COUNTY FLoOD CONTROL DIST. v.
SOUTHERN CAL. EDISON CO.

335

tSI C.M 331; 33lI P.M 11

Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 [41 Am.Rep. 618, 625]; ScrantonPa.~cago1l1a Realty Co. v. City of Pascagoula, 157 MifolS. 498
1128 So. 73, 74]; ](ilcy v. Bond, 114 Mich. 447 [72 N.W. 253,
254].)
[3] Edison contends, however, that the use of public
streets for storm drains can only be considered a primary use
of the streets when the principal purpose of the drains is to
drain the streets themselves. When, as in this case, the principal use of the drains will be to drain the entire areas served
and drainage of the streets will be only incidental thereto,
Edison contends that use for drainage is on a parity with its
own use, and that therefore the district must pay for relocating
Edison's preexisting facilities. We find no basis in the cases
for the distinction Edison seeks to draw based on what may
be the primary purpose of any particular drain. Thus in the
New Orleans Gas Company case, the defendant's purpose
was to provide drainage for the entire city and not merely
the streets thereof. It would be manifestly impossible to
provide drainage for the public streets without also draining
the surrounding land, and the right of abutting owners to
discharge surface waters onto the public streets is recognized
as a customary use of the streets. (Portman v. Clementina
Co., 147 Cal.App.2d 651, 659-660 [305 P.2d 963]; see also
Kramer v. City of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 668, 674-676 [82 P.
334].) [4] Moreover, the fact that a comprehensive :flood
control system requires construction of trunk drains that primarily service areas other than the streets under or across
which they are located does not affect the character of the
public use or limit the public's right in the public streets.
Thus, in the Los Angeles Gas Company case, although the
(lity's sewer served incidentally at most the county street
under which it passed, we held that the company's franchise
obligations were not affected. [5] c, Such obligations rest
on the paramount right of the people as a whole to use the
public streets wherever located, and the fact that a franchi",e
is granted by one political subdivision as an agent of the state
[citations], does not defeat the right of another such agent
acting in its governmental capacity to invoke the public right
for the public benefit. [Citations.] " (Southern Calif. Gas
Co. v. Los Angeles, 50 Ca1.2d 713, 717 [329 P.2d 289].)
Edison ('ontends that any obligation to relocate its facilities at its own expense rests in the police power of the state
and that the state has 110t delegated its police power in this
respect to the district. It invokes the rule that grants of
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power to municipal corporations are to be strictly construed
and any doubts resolved against the existence of the power
claimed. (See Harden v. Superior Oourt, 44 Ca1.2d 630, 641
[284 P.2d 9], and cases cited.) [6] Section 2 of the Los
Angeles County Flood Control Act expressly authorizes the
district to "construct, maintain and operate," the drains here
involved. (West's, Wat. Code-Appendix, § 28.2, 1 Deering's
Wat. Code, Act 4463, § 2.) In doing so it is exercising the
police power of the state. (House v. Los Angeles County Flood
Oontrol Dist., 25 Ca1.2d 384, 392 [153 P.2d 950] ; O'Hara v.
Los Angeles Oounty Flood etc. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 64 [119
P.2d 23].) [7] By insisting that Edison is obligated to
relocate its facilities at its own expense, the district is not
seeking to exercise an implied authority to impose additional
burdens upon Edison, but is relying on the claimed existence
of obligations that arose when Edison accepted its various
franchises. (See City of San Antonio v. San Antonio St.
By. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App.l [39 S.W.136, 139] ; New Orleans
Gaslight 00. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans, 111
La. 838 [35 So. 929, 933], at'f'd, 197 U.S. 453 [25 S.Ct.
471, 49 L.Ed. 831].) If, as the district contends, Edison
accepted its franchise rights in public streets subject to
implied obligations to relocate its facilities at its own expense
when necessary to make way for proper governmental uses
of the street, there was no need expressly to authorize the
district to impose such obligations, for Edison had already assumed them.
[8] Edison contends, however, that the 1953 amendment to
section 16 of the Los Angeles County Flood Control Act pro,videa for the payment of its relocation costs by the district.
The amendment, which follows the act's enumeration of the
powers of the board of supervisors of the district, states, "provided, however, that nothing in this act contained shall be
deemed to authorize said district in exercising any of its
powers to take, damage or destroy any property or to require
the removal, relocation, alteration or destruction of any
bridge, railroad, wire line, pipeline, facility or other structure
unless just compensation therefor be first made, in the manner and to the extent required by the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of California." (Stats.
1953, ch. 1139, p. 2635, § 1.) This provision cannot reasonably
be iuterpreted, as Edison contends, to mean that compensation
is to be made in the manner and to the extent that would be
required if the constitutional provisions required compensa-
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tion. It clearly provides for compensation only as "required"
by those provisions. Had the Legislature intended that the
district should go beyond constitutional requirements in making compensation it is reasonable to assume that it would have
adopted language similar to that found in many other flood
control acts adopted before, after, and contemporaneously
with the 1953 amendment. For example the Marin County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act provides
that the district shall "in addition to the damage for the
taking, injury, or destruction of property, also pay the cost
of removal, reconstruction or relocation of any structure,
railways, mains, pipes, conduits, wires, cable, poles, of any
public utility which is required to be moved to a new location .
. . . " (Stats. 1953, ch. 666, p.1915, 1919; West, Water CodeAppendix, § 68-5 (13); 1 Deering's Wat. Code, Act 4599,
subd. 13.) It is true that if the amendment does no more
than require compliance with the state and federal Oonstitutions, its enactment was unnecessary, and given the
Legislature's awareness of the problem as evidenced by
provisions of other flood control acts enacted at the aame
session, it is at least dubious that by expressly reaffirming the
district's constitutional obligations, it was intended by implication to negative others that might also exist. Had the Legislature in 1953 clearly not wanted the district to pay reloea.tion expenses, it could have expressed this intent also more
clearly than by merely reaffirming the district's constitu-tional obligations. Nevertheless, the fact remains that thc
plain language of the 1953 amendment provides for payment
only to the "extent required" by the constitutional provisions,
.and if it is anything more than an admonition to obey the
constitutions, it constitutes legislative recognition that the
district is not obligated to pay for utility relocations unless
constitutional provisions so require.
[9] Edison contends that section 15 of the act grants the
district a franchise to use the public streets and that therefore its rights therein are no greater than those of any other
franchise holder and, accordingly, that the later user must
bear the costs of relocating the earlier user's facilities. Essentially the same contention was answered adversely to
Edison's position in the Southern California Gas Company
case where we held that a franchise exercised by a city in its
governmental capacity is not subordinate to a prior franchise
granted to a public utility. (Southern Calif. Gas Co. v. Los
Angeles, 8upt"a, 50 Ca1.2d 713, 718-719.)
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[10] Edison contends that the express terms of the Fran('hisc Act of 1937- define its obligation to relocate its facilities
at its OW11 expcnsc and that as to franchises granted pursuant
to that act any other similar obligations are excluded by clear
implication. V-le rejected a similar contention based on the
maxim expressio unius cxclusio alterius est in the Southern
California Gas Company case, and although there are some
differences between the franchise provisions involved, the rule
of strict construction of public grants in the public inteTf'st
(Knoxville Waiet· Co. v. KfI.()xvillc, 200 U.S. 22, 33-34 [26
8.Ct. 224, 50 L.Ed. 353] ; City of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas If;
Electric Co., 173 Cal. 787, 791 [161 P. 978] ; County of Los
Angeles v. Southern Calif. Tel. Co., 32 Ca1.2d 378, 384 [196
P.2d 773J; Civ. Code, § 1069) compels the same conclusion
here. As in that case most of the provisions relied on as excluding any implied obligations may reasonably be interpreted
as no more than partial expressions of common-law rights
and obligations inserted out i)f an abundance of caution or by
way of example only. It is true that section 6297 of the Public
Utilities Code may go beyond a restatement of the commonlaw rule by requiring the utility to remove rather than merely
relocate its facilities to make way for public travel, but if
it does so, a point we need not decide, it snpplies an additional
reason why the maxim cxpressio 1lnius does not apply. Had
the statute referred only to removal it might cast doubt on the
right to relocate instead when relocation would be sufficient to
subserve the public interest. There was thus a special reason
for mentioning relocation for the specified purposes in section
6297, and it may not therefore be inferred that relocation
was included to exclude by implication obligations to relocate
for other purposes. (City of Lexington v. Commercial Bank,
130 Mo.App. 687 [108 S.W. 1095, 1096J.) In short, here as
in the Los Angeles Gas Company case, the enumeration of

i

·"The grantee of a franchise under this chapter shall construct, install,
lind maintain all pipes, conduits, poles, wires, and appurtenances in
accordance snd in conformity ....-ith all of the ordinances and rules
adopted by the legislative body of the municipality in the exercise of its
police powers and not in conflict with the paramount autllOrity of tho
State, and, as to stnte highways, lIubject to the laws relating to the
location and maintenance of wch facilities therein." (Pub. Util. Code,
§ 6294.)
"The grantee sllall remOTe or relocate without expeDl~e to the muniei.
113lity any facilities install{'d, usted, and nJ:l.illt:lrnt>d under the franchiHo
if and wIlen made necessary l.y ony lawful rl,ange of gra<1e, alignment,
or width of allY pul>lic strt'ct, way, nlley, or ))Iace, including the CODstrudure of any subway or "iaduct, by tIle Dlunicipality." (Pub. Uti!.
Code, t 6297.)

;Dee.1958] L.A.
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what were considererl to be the most important of the utilitics'
obligations cannot rcasonably be interpreted as au "express
direction of the Legislatnre" passing thc utilities' other eommon-law obligations over to the taxpayer. (Transit Comm1:ssion v. Long Island R. Co., 253 N.Y. 345 [171 N.E. 565, 568] ;
New Y07'k City Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
295 N.Y. 467 [68 N.E.2d 445, 448-449]; St. Helena v. Sail
Francisco etc. By., 24 Cal.App. 71, 78 [140 P. 600, 605];
County Court v. White, 79 W.Va. 475 [91 S.E. 350, 352,
IJ.R.A. 1917D 660] ; Peoples Gas MUllt &'; Coke Co. v. City of
Chicago, 413 Ill. 457 [109 N.E.2d 777, 787]; Nicholas Di
Menna &- Sons v. City of New York, 114 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350.)
No contention is made that the provisions of any of the
franchises granted to Edison other than pursuant to the 1937
Aet are more favorable to its position than those considered
above, and accordingly it is unnecessary to consider such
other franchises separately.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to enter judgment for the district declaring its rights in accord with the views herein expressed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
McComb, J., dissented.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion in the case at bar is another link in
the chain of confusion which exists in the opinions of this court
which involves the exercise of the police power and the exercise of the power of eminent domain. I pointed out in my
concurring opinion in Southern CaUf. Gas Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 50 Ca1.2d 713 [329 P.2d 289], that cases in which
the right of eminent domain was involved are cited as authority in cases involving the exercise of the police power and
police power cases are cited in support of cases involving the
eminent domain power.
.
I am unable to understand on just what theory the majority
relies in the case under consideration. It appears that it must
be the police power given to the flood control district by the
majority of this court which is the basis for its holding that
the Edison Company must relocate its facilities at its own
expense.
It has long been a rule of law in this state that political
subdivisions such as drainage districts, irrigation districts,
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and the like, are entities of limited powers-those which have
been expressly granted them by the Legislature. (StimsOfl. v.
Alessandro lrr. Dist., 135 Cal. 389, 392, 393 [67 P. 496, 1034] ;
City 0/ Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306, 310-312 [184 P. 397] ;
Leeman v. Perris Irrigation Dist., 140 Cal. 540, 543 [74 P.
24] ; -Bottoms v. Madera Irr. Dist., 74 Cal.App. 681, 694, 695
[242 P. 100] ; Harden v. Superior C01trt, 44 Cal.2d 630, 642
[284 P.2d 9].) The only qualification to this rule is that certain powers strictly necessary to carry out those expressly
granted by the Legislature are implied.
The Los Angeles County Flood Control District was created
by the Legislature in 1915 (Stats. 1915, ch. 755, p. 1052-1512,
§§ 1-23 inclusive). The act is now found in Deering's Water
Code as Act 4463, sections 1-23 inclusive, pages 325-354.
Section 2 sets forth the objectives of the act as providing
for the control and conservation of the flood, storm and other
waste waters of the district "and to conserve such waters
for beneficial and useful purposes by spreading, storing, retaining or causing to percolate into the soil within said district,
or to save or conserve in any manner, all or any of such,
waters, and to protect from damage from such flood or storm
waters, the harbors, waterways, public highways and property of said district. " The same section then provides: •• Said
Los Angeles County Flood Control District is hereby declared to be a body corporate and politic, and as IUCh .haU
have power: • • •
4'1. To have perpetual succession.
"2. To sue and be sued •••
u 3. To adopt a seal • • . ; _
"4. To take by grant, purebase, gift, devise or lease ••• 1
real or personal property of every tind within or without
the district necessary to the full exercise of its power.
"5. To acquire or contract to acquire lands, rights of way,
easements, privileges and property of every kind, and construct, maintain and operate any and all works or improve.
ments •. '
1
"6. To Mve and ezerci8e the right of eminent domain,:
and in the manner prot1ided by law for the condemnation of,
private property for public use, to take any property "eces.:
.ary to carry out any of the objects or purposes of this act, I
whether such property be already devoted to the same use'
by any district or other public corporation or agency or:
otherwise, and may condemn any existing works or improve-!
ments in said district now used to control flood or storm'
I
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'waters, or to conserve such flood or storm waters or to protect any property in said district from damage from such
flood or storm waters." (Emphasis added.)
Subsection 7 provides for the incurment of debt and the
issuance of bonds; subsection 7a provides for the borrowing of
federal funds; subsection 7b provides for the sale of bonds to
the county; subsection 8 provides for the collection of taxes;
flubsection 9 provides for the making of contracts; subsection
10 provides for the granting of easements; subsection 11 provides for the disposal of rubbish; subsection 12 provides for
. the payment of bond premiums; subsection 13 provides for
the disposal of property. The subsections to section 2 as just
set forth provide all the powers granted to the district by
the Legislature. It is apparent that the district is not granted

the right to exercise the state's police power.
Article I, section 14, of the California Constitution provides, in part, that "Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation having
first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner..•. "
This refers to the right of eminent domain.
In 1953, section 16 of Act 4463 was amended to provide
for certain powers in the board of supervisors in the exercise
of the district's right of eminent domain. The amendment
provides, in part, as follows: "[P]rovided, however, that

'lothing in this act contained shall be deemed to autkoNe
said district in exercising any of its powers 10 take, damage
or destroy any property or to require the removal, relocation,
alteration Of' destruction of any bridge, railroad, tDireline,
pipeline, facility or other structure unless just compensation
therefor be first made, in the manner and to the extent required by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California." (Emphasis added.)
In my opinion, the Legislature of this state could not have
more clearly expressed its meaning: That the relocation of
Bny facility was an exercise by the district of its power of
eminent domain and that compensation should be made therefor as provided in the California Constitution, article I, section 14.
The reasoning fonnd in thc majority opinion on the meaning and etit'et of the 1953 amendment heretofore set forth,
whilc extremely amhiguous and a masterpiece of confusion,
apparently means that since the Constitution of California
docs not spell out in words of one syllable that relocations of
,variolls types of facilities arc to be compensated in money, the
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IJegislature did not really mean what it said-that it intended just compensation to be made for such relocations.
It is first argued in the majority opinion that if the amendment only required the district to abide by its constitutional
obligations, the amendment was unnecessary; and then that
it was "dubious" that the Legislature intended by implication
to negative "others" (probably constitutional obligations)
that "might also exist." Then the following unclear language
appears: "Had the Legislature in 1953 clearly not wanted the
district to pay relocation expenses, it could have expressed
this intent also more clearly than by merely reaffirming the
district's constitutional obligations. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the plain language of the 1953 amendment provides for payment only t~ the • extent required' by the constitutional provisions, and if it is anything more than an
admonition to obey the constitutions, it constitutes legislative
recognition that the district is not obligated to pay for utility
relocations unless constitutional provisions so require." When

the Legislature clearly states that compensation is to be m.ade
for relocatwns how is it possible for the m.ajority to assume
that the Legisla.turc clea"'ly did not want the district to pay
for such relocations' The entire section (16) deals with the
district's right of eminent domain and the supervisors' duties
and powers in connection therewith. The Constitutions provide that private property shall not be taken or damaged
without just compensation being made therefor. There is no
reason whatsoever for the nebulous reasoning and negative
thinking set forth in the majority opinion.
If we assume that the theory on which the conclusion
reached by the majority is that the district is exercising thc
police power of the state, a complete answer is that the district
has no police power. In the majority opinion is the following
Rtatement: "Section 2 of the Los Angeles County Flood Control Act expressly authorizes the district to 'constrnct, maintRill, and operate,' the drains here inyoly('d (West's, Wat<~l'
Code-Appendix, § 28-2.) In doing so it is exercising the
police power of the state. (House v. Los Angeles County
Flood Control Disf., 25 Ca1.2d 384, 392 [153 P.2d 950];
O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d
61,64 rU9 P.2tl 23).)" In cOlJstructillg, l1lUilltail1illg and
operatillg the draills Ilf'rt' iuvolVt'd tIle district was t'xerei:,;ilJg
a power expressly granted to it by the Legislature of this
state. It is true that the grant of the power was given by
the state as an exercise of the stale's police power but that is
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Dot to say that in the delegation of the powers $pecifically
enuDlcrated iu the a('t cr('ating thc district the Legislature
also granted to the district the state's police power in other
respects. In the House case this court reversed a judgment
of dismissal entered after the trial court had sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint for damages to her property
occasioned by the district's negligence in planning, construction and maintenance of certain flood control channel work.
We noted that the plaintiff "rests her right of recovery upon
article I, section 14, of the state Constitution, which provides
that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation to the owner. The trial court
erred in la~11:ng to sustain the constitutional basis 01 the plaintif/'s claim under the disU,lguisha'ble concept of her pleading. " (House v. Los AlIgeles Oounty Flood Oontrol Dist.,
;25 Ca1.2d 384, 386 [153 P.2d 950]; emphasis added.) While
:the court spoke of the poli('e power the case was not decided
upon the theory that tbe flood control district was exercising
the police power of the state. It was said: "While the police
'power is very broad in concept, it is not without restriction
in relation to thc taking 01' damaging of property. When it
passes beyond proper bounds in its invasion of property
rights, it in effect comes within the purview of the law of
eminent domain and its exercise requires compensation.
. [Citations.] In fact, on the point of a governmental agency's
·liability for damages arising in connection with its undertaking construction work, the prevailing opinion in the Archer
ease [Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 [119 P.2d
:1]] $upra, does not purport to dispute the settled principle
that public necessity limits the right to exact uncompensated
submission from the property owner if his property be either
damaged, taken or destroyed. Rather it is expressly stated
there in the prevailing opinion (19 Ca1.2d 23-24) : 'The state
or its subdivisions may take or damage private property without compensation if such action is essent1'aZ to safeguard public
health, safety or morals. [Citing autllOrities.] In certain
circ1tmsta1tCl'.'1, 11Ol/'ct'er, the taking or d{1magiflg of private
propc,·ty lor such a p1,rposc is not prompted 'by so great a
'leees,'1ity as to be jlfstified 1vithotlt propcr compensation to
the owner. [Citing antllOrities.]' (Italics aclded.) Thus
there is recognized the incontestable proposit.ion that the
exercise of the police power, though an essent.ial attribute of
sovereignty for the public welfare and arbitrary in itc; nature,
(·annot. extend b~yond tIle necessities of the case and be made a
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cloak to dellt.roy conRtitutionaJ rights m; to thp. inviolateness of
private property." (Pp. 388, 389.) The House case, with
its reliance upon the Archer case, demonstrates again the confusion which exists in the cases. The House case involved an ,
action against the flood control district. The Archer case involved an action against the city of Los Angeles. Article
XI, section 11, of the California Constitution provides that
"Any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce
within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." This is
known as the constitutional police power provision. It does
not provide that any flood control, or sanitary, or mosquito
abatement district may exercise the police power of the state.
O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d 61
[119 P.2d 23], also relied upon by the majority for its statement that the district was exercising the "police power"
of the state was decided upon the theory that a lower riparian
owner has no redress for injury to his land caused by improvements in the stream when there has been no diversion of water
out of its natural channel. The following statement is found
in the majority opinion in the 0 'Hara case: "Compensation
for private property taken or damaged for a public use must
be made under article I, section 14, only when the taking or
damaging of property is not so essential to the public health,
safety, and morals as to be justified under the 'police power,'
and the injury is one which would give rise to a cause of action
on the part of the owner if it were inflicted by a private person. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, ante, p. 19 [119 P.2d 1],
this day decided.)" Again, it will be noted, that while the
flood control district was involved, the Archer case, which
involved the city, was cited as authority. While the city of
Los Angeles may, by eonstitutional authority, exercise both
the police power and the power of eminent domain, a flood
control district has only the authority and powers specifically
delegated to it by the Legislature. In this particular instance
the flood control district of Los Angeles County may exercise
only the power of eminent domain and, by reason of the 1953
amendment to the act as heretofore set forth, the required
relocation of certain enumerated facilities by the district is
considered by the Legislature to be an exercise of its power of
eminent domain and the owner of the facility must be compensated for such relocation. It is only where the state, or
one 0/ its political subdivisions having thc right to exe,.ci.~e
the police power, is involyed tIlat the so-called "twilight zone"
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('omes into play and the heretofore quoted language from the
Archer case is pertinent. In the case at bar, as in the House
and 0 'Hara eases, a political subdivision, the Los Angeles
Flood Control District, is involved and it is emphatically
pointed out that the Los Angeles Flood Control District has
)10 right to exercise the police power of the state inasmuch as
the Legisiature has not seen fit to so authorize it in the act
which created it and the amendments thereto.
The 1953 amendment to the act was not an "unnecessary"
legislative act as intimated in the majority opinion. The purpose thereof was to make certain that a required relocation
of certain facilities by the district was part of its eminent
domain power. While the language therein specifically re(luiring compensation to be paid therefor might be considered
unnecessary in view of the constitutional requirement that
just compensation be paid for the taking of private property,
under the reasoning of the majority it was obviously. neeessary--even if, under the holding here, quite futile.
I recently prepared a concurring opinion upholding the
right of the city of Los Angeles to require a utility company
to relocate its facilities without compensation to make way
for a sewer line which the city was installing in a public
street or road (Southern Calif. OM Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
50 Cal.2d 713 [329 P.2d 289)). In said opinion I stated that
under the authorities the city was performing a governmental
function and was exercising the police power granted to it by
the Constitution of this state. It should be perfectly ,clear
from that opinion that the rule announced in the majority
opinion there cannot be relied upon in support of the position
of the plaintiff here, as neither the Constitution nor the
I>tatutes of this state purport to give the plaintiff any of the
power exercised by the city in that case.
In my opinion the judgment of the trial court in favor
of defendant Rnd cross-complainant, Southern California
Edison Company, should be affirmed.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I am in accord with the principles of law discussed by Mr. Justice Carter and concur in
his conclusion that the judgment of the trial court in favor
of Southern Califomia Edison Company should be affirmed.
]~t'SJ>Olllh'llt 's lletitioll for a rehearjng was denied January
14, 1959. Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

